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SECOND HAND PREJUDICE, RACIAL ANALOGIES
AND SHARED SHOWERS: WHY "DON'T ASK,
DON'T TELL" WON'T SELL
PAUL SIEGEL*
I. INTRODUCrION
Marine Colonel Fred Peck earned his fifteen minutes of
fame back in May of 1993 when he was one of several witnesses
testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee chaired
by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia. Peck's Senate appearance
played prominently on the network television news programs.'
His name and photo adorned front page stories the next day in
major newspapers nationwide.2 His family's saga was the focus of
Larry King's program on CNN.'
Colonel Peck told the committee that he is proud of the
Marine Corps, but he would strongly advise his son Scott not to
enlist, for fear that the younger Peck's life would be in danger
from the outset-not from Iraqi Scud missiles or terrorist bombs,
* Associate Professor of Communication Arts, Gallaudet University.
1. See Macneil/Lehrer News Hour. Dividing The Ranks, (PBS television
broadcast, May 11, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, MACLEH File;
Nightline: Gays in The Military: Don't Ask Don't Tell? (ABC television broadcast,
May 11, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File; World News
Tonigh (ABC television broadcast, May 11, 1993), available in LEXIS, News
Library, ABCNEW file. On the evening following Colonel Peck's testimony, his
was the lead story on both the CBS Evening News and the NBC Nightly News.
See CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast, May 11, 1993); NBC Nightly News
(NBC television broadcast, May 11, 1993) (Information concerning both
programs was obtained with the assistance of John Lynch of the Vanderbilt
University Television News Archives.). On May 24, 1994 the entire Peck family
was profiled on ABC's Nightline. See Nightline: An American Family (ABC
television broadcast, May 24, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW
File.
2. William E. Clayton Jr., Military Not For Gay Son, Colonel Says, HOUSTON
CHRON., May 12, 1993, at 1; Kreisher, Colonel Fears For Gay Son's Safety, SAN
DIEGo UmoN-TRB., May 12, 1993, at Al; John Lancaster, Marine Jolts Gay-
Ban Hearing: Revealing His Son Is Homosexual, Officer Opposes Policy Change, WASH.
PosT, May 12, 1993, at Al; Ana Puga, Colonek Military Not For Gay Son, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 12, 1993, at 1; Mark Thompson, Colonel: My Gay Son "Should Not
Serve," ARiz. REP., May 12, 1993, at Al.
3. Larry King Live: Gays in the Military: One Family's Dilemma, (CNN
television broadcast, May 13, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, CNN File.
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but at the hands of his fellow Marines. The reason for this dire
prediction: his son is gay.4
Colonel Peck's testimony was remarkable in part because of
its counterintuitive posture (an argument that one's own son
should properly suffer employment discrimination). His was a
textbook example of a speaker's credibility derived from appear-
ing to argue against his own interests. This is the same principle
that makes our ears perk up when a prison inmate argues in
favor of longer jail sentences.
A second feature of Peck's testimony seemed to escape
media commentary, perhaps because of its obviousness. Peck
predicted that openly gay soldiers would be physically abused,
perhaps even assassinated, by their heterosexual counterparts.
He did not suggest, however, that hostility towards homosexuals
is an appropriate response. He did not suggest that gays are
immoral and vile creatures who deserve to die. Instead, Peck
went out of his way to distance his own feelings about homosexu-
ality from those of the Marines who he feared would do his son
harm. He began by describing his own military career, including
a stint as director of the Corps' public affairs office in Los
Angeles:
I worked with the entertainment industry out there.
And let me tell you, I probably don't need to say this, but I
worked with a lot of people in Hollywood whose sexual ori-
4. Colonel Peck maintained:
[I]f the ban on gays and lesbians serving in the military were to be
dropped, I would counsel all three'of my sons to stay out of the
military. Absolutely. My oldest son, Scott, is a student at the
University of Maryland. He'sjust about to graduate. If he were to walk
into a recruiter's office, it would be the recruiter's dream come true.
He's 6'1", blue-eyed, blonde hair, great student .... But if he were to
go and seriously consider joining the military, I would have to,
number one, personally counsel against it," and number two, actively
fight it because my son Scott is a homosexual. And I don't think
there's any place for him in the military. I love him. I love him as
much as I do any of my sons. I respect him. I think he's a fine person.
But he should not serve in the military. And ... that's the strongest
testimonial I think I can give. I'm a father of a homosexual... young
man, and I don't think he should serve in the military. I spent 27
years of my life in the military, and I know what it would be like for
him if he went in. And it would be hell, and if we went into combat
... he'd be at grave risk. If he were to follow in my footsteps as an
infantry platoon leader or a company commander, I would be very
fearful that his life would be in jeopardy from his own troops.
Gays in the Military, Senate Armed Services Committee (Fed. News. Serv. May 11,
1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW File [hereinafter Senate Hear-
ing May 11, 1993] (testimony of Colonel Fred Peck) (emphasis added).
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entations and a lot of other things about their personal
lifestyles were much, much different than my own. I think
I was successful there. I think I've been successful in the
civilian educational environment. And I'm saying this to
tell you that I'm not a homophobe, I'm not the kind of
person who's lived some cloistered, sheltered military life,
who's never had to deal with homosexuals before, work
with them all the time.5
Colonel Peck's testimony may have been more dramatic
than that of the other career military leaders who came in front
of the Nunn committee. The basic thesis of his remarks, how-
ever, was repeated again and again by those favoring the mili-
tary's ban against lesbians and gay males. The reason we need
the ban, supporters argued, was not because the military leader-
ship is disgusted by homosexuality or by gay people.6 Instead the
raw recruits, who are barely out of their teens, and often from
the lower ends of the socioeconomic continuum-they would
have an enormous difficulty in dealing with gay coworkers (and
especially gay bunkmates)., To maintain the morale of the
nation's forces, the ban must not be lifted.
This Article's thesis is that those who support the military's
gay ban using this kind of reasoning are manifesting a form of
"second hand prejudice" that is inimical to basic constitutional
principles. Part II will examine the nature of "prejudice once
removed" in various legal contexts. First, it reviews the two lead-
ing Supreme Court decisions rejecting the state's reliance upon
second hand prejudice as a violation of constitutionally guaran-
teed equal protection under law., Next it examines the second
hand prejudice argument as an instance of the "heckler's veto"
developed in First Amendment jurisprudence. Finally it presents
a sampling of lower court cases from the gay rights movement in
which courts have rejected second hand prejudice arguments.
Part III argues that the military's "don't ask, don't tell" pol-
icy is simply one more manifestation of second hand prejudice
5. Senate Hearing May 11, 1993, supra note 4.
6. Colonel Peck noted that he too would have difficulty "living with" gays
or "coexisting with them in a military environment." Yet he did not beat his son
or disown him for being gay. Colonel Peck's own actions around a gay person
differ dramaticaly from the dismal report he made regarding how other
Marines would react.
7. "I can guarantee you that these young people who are young - in
their 20s, 22, 23 or even younger, will spot a homosexual a mile away as soon as
he comes in . . ." Hearing of the Republican Research Committee's Task Force on
Military Personne4 Feb. 4, 1993 [hereinafter Republican Research Comm.]
(Testimony of Admiral Thomas Moorer, former Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff).
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and that the military's view of "homosexual conduct" as incom-
patible with military service is a disingenuous and insupportable
posture. This section is not intended as an exhaustive review of
caselaw and commentaries aimed at refuting all governmental
arguments in favor of keeping the gay ban.' Rather it will focus.
on the two pro-ban arguments that seem to have succeeded more
than any other in crossing over from the Senate hearing rooms
into the public consciousness. The first of these is the "commu-
nal showers" argument, the notion that just as we would not
force male and female soldiers to shower together and to use
toilets during the same hours, so too would it be an invasion
upon the privacy of heterosexual soldiers to have them share
such facilities with lesbians and gay males. The second argu-
ment, offered in its strongest form by former Chair of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, is that sexual orientation is different
from race in ways that make the military's experience of desegre-
gating the armed forces in decades past inapplicable to the gay
ban.
II. SECOND HAND PREJUDICE AND THE LAW
A. The Palmore and Cleburne Decisions
When Linda Sidoti and her husband Anthony, both Cauca-
sians, divorced, the court gave Linda custody of the couple's 3-
year-old daughter. Sometime later, Anthony returned to court,
seeking custody of his daughter once again. Among the
"changed circumstances" he brought to the court's attention was
his former spouse's having taken up residence with (and later
marrying) a new lover of African-American descent named Clar-
ence Palmore. The judge gave custody to Anthony, basing his
decision, in part, upon the level of prejudice the child would
encounter by dint of her mother's interracial marriage. "Despite
the strides that have been made in bettering relations between
the races in this country," the judge wrote, "it is inevitable that
8. The military often raises the more global argument that it is a special
setting, and that its leadership should receive a high level of deference because
it is uniquely qualified to ascertain the special needs of that setting. Able I v.
United States, 847 F. Supp. 1038, 1042 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Yet even in these
situations the military leadership will be called upon to articulate the interests
in jeopardy. The interest in maintaining unit cohesion has been the military's
main response to this inquiry. However, the refutations offered in Part III of
this Article to the unit cohesion rationale (refutations aimed at showing that we
need not fear the prospect of straights and gays sharing showers together, and
that Colin Powell's rejection of the historical analogy to the military's successful
experience in racially desegregating is mistaken) constitute refutations of the
global appeals to deference as well.
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Melanie will.. . suffer from the social stigmatization that is sure
to come."9 Chief Justice Burger's unanimous opinion overturn-
ing the lower court ruling illustrated the Supreme Court's desire
to weed out injustice in a category of caselaw (child custody dis-
putes) that rarely merits its review. The Court made clear that it
was not making this decision out of naivet6:
It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic
prejudices do not exist or that all manifestations of those
prejudices have been eliminated. There is a risk that a
child living with a stepparent of a different race may be
subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not present if
the child were living with parents of the same racial or eth-
nic origin.10
Other issues raised by this case, Burger continued, tran-
scended the immediate question of what placement would seem,
at first blush, to be in the best interests of the child:
The question, however, is whether the reality of private
biases and the possible injury they might inflict are permis-
sible considerations for removal of an infant child from the
custody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty con-
cluding that they are not. The Constitution cannot control
such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. 1
The facts in Palmore emphasize the case's relevance to the
gay military issue. 1 2 Many who favor the military ban argue that
the armed forces should not be forced to be the laboratory for
"social engineering," however laudable the goals of such reform
might be.1" In Palmore the Court unanimously accepted a situa-
9. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431 (1984).
10. Id. at 433.
11. Id.
12. The holding in Palmore is tied to the heightened scrutiny standard
required by the Court's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis as
applied to race. Id. at 432. The Court has never held that sexual orientation
discrimination requires the same level of scrutiny. In this sense, this Article
argues by analogy, often from dicta. Yet the reasoning of the Court could not
be more clear-second hand prejudice is not permitted. Part II, Subsection C
of this Article will demonstrate that the same conclusion has often been drawn
by lower courts called upon to adjudicate gay rights issues.
13. See, e.g., Senate Hearing May 11, 1993, supra note 4 (testimony of
General Norman Schwarzkopf) ("The armed forces' principal mission is not to
be instruments of social experimentation. The first, foremost, and all-eclipsing
mission of our military is to be ready to fight our nation's wars, and when called
upon to do so, to win those wars."); see also Charles Moskos, Mandating Inclusion:
The Militaiy as a Social Lab, 354 CuRRgrr 20 (1993) ("The justification of the
military remains-at least to date-national defense, not welfare or social
engineering.").
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tion in which an innocent child was to be the vehicle by which
the goal of racial equality would be "engineered."
In its next term, the Court used Palmore to invalidate a zon-
ing ordinance in Cleburne, Texas that required a "hospital for
the feebleminded" (a group home for retarded adults) to obtain
a special use permit. The permit was only obtainable if none of
the homeowners within 200 feet of the facility objected. 4 That
such a restrictive procedure was almost never used to resolve
other kinds of zoning issues, Justice White concluded for the
Court, "appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against
the mentally retarded . . ."i In his opinion, Justice White also
quoted Palmore's maxim that "[p] rivate biases may be outside the
reach of the. law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect."16
The Clebumrne decision is especially instructive. The Court
was able to invalidate the local zoning ordinance at issue without
finding mental retardates a suspect class or even a quasi-suspect
class. Thus, Justice White's opinion suggests that irrational
prejudices cannot alone form the basis for disparate treatment of
even unprotected groups, such as lesbians and gays.
Both Palmore and Cleburne were adjudicated under Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection analyses. The notion that
second hand prejudices on the part of private parties should not
be embraced and furthered by the state emerges even more
strongly in the context of the "heckler's veto" in First Amend-
mentjurisprudence. A review of this caselaw is the subject of the
next section.
B. Second Hand Prjudice and the First Amendment
The maxim that a constitutionally recognizable interest can-
not be abridged by the state merely in deference to the
prejudices of others is a firmly established principle of First
Amendment jurisprudence. Decades ago, Professor Harry
Kalven coined the term "heckler's veto" to refer to this principle
of constitutional law. 7 Although the Supreme Court has rarely
used the phrase,"8 it has consistently embraced the principle.
14. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
15. I& at 450.
16. Id. at 448 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
17. HARRY KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FiRsT AMENDMENT 140-145
(1965).
18. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 2407-08
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1
(1966).
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Early "heckler's veto" cases involved outdoor speeches deliv-
ered by orators of one radical stripe or another to highly volatile
crowds of supporters, critics, or both. The speaker in Terminiello
v. Chicago9 delivered a diatribe against Jews, Communists and
others. The Court overturned Terminiello's disorderly conduct
conviction. Justice Douglas made clear that the First Amend-
ment was designed to protect even the most unruly speakers:
[A] function of free speech under our system of govern-
ment is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dis-
satisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It
may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of
an idea.2 °
Two years later, Justices Black and Douglas dissented from a
decision that upheld a "breach of the peace" conviction against a
left-wing speaker. 2' The dissenters argued that before the police
"ever can interfere with a lawful public speaker, they first must
make all reasonable efforts to protect him."22 Speakers who con-
front hostile audiences need government protection. If they do
not receive it and if the state permits the mob to dictate the
acceptability of speech topics, then the state will have "become
the new censors ...,2 A corollary argument could be raised in
the context of the gay military debate. If the military leadership
fails to instill values of tolerance and mutual respect in recruits,
then the leadership will have become the allies of those few
recruits who might strike out at their openly gay comrades.
The logic of the Black/Douglas dissent in Feiner has gener-
ally24 become the Supreme Court majority doctrine. In 1966, the
19. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
20. Id. at 4. It is not my intention that the Terminilo logic should be
imported wholesale into the military debate. Fostering dissension or
dissatisfaction among the troops is not a goal of military service. This Article
does not argue that First Amendment rights in the military are or should be
coextensive with those enjoyed in civilian life. Rather, it posits that predictions
of negative effects upon military unit cohesion should the ban be lifted are
greatly overstated.
• 21. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). Many commentators have
pointed out the difficulty in reconciling the Feiner and Terminielo decisions.
The answer may be as simple as a change in Court personnel. See David Currie,
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1946-1953, 37 EMORY L.J. 249, 264 (1988).
22. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 326 (Black and Douglas, B., dissenting).
23. Id. at 331.
24. Cf. William H. Freivogel, Free Speech: Attack on flag Burner Here Raises
Questions by Experts, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, March 28, 1991, at IC (arguing
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Court overturned a breach of the peace conviction where the
defendants had conducted a "sit-in" to protest a public library's
segregationist policies.25  Justice Fortas' plurality opinion
explained that "participants in an orderly demonstration in a
public place are not chargeable with the danger, unprovoked
except by the fact of the constitutionally protected demonstra-
tion itself, that their critics might react with disorder or vio-
lence."26 Three years later, Dick Gregory's disorderly conduct
conviction in Chicago was similarly overturned.27 Gregory and
his followers had picketed Mayor Daley's residence and the
immediate neighborhood in protest of the city's failure to deseg-
regate its schools. The Court found that the disorder had come
not from Gregory but from the Mayor's neighbors, who had
pelted the demonstrators with rocks and other objects and had
turned their garden hoses on them.
The issue of how to properly define patriotism often seems
to be at the core of the gay military debate. Ban supporters claim
that gays inappropriately emphasize the "individual rights"
aspects of the debate to the detriment of the common good,
while ban opponents counter that they are the true patriots, will-
ing to risk their lives for their country even in the face of a con-
tinuing pattern of prejudice against them. The flag burning
cases that became so much a part of the 1988 Presidential cam-
paign rhetoric similarly forced the Court to deal with the rela-
tionship between the First Amendment and patriotism. In the
first case,28 the Court held that Texas's flag desecration statute
was unconstitutionally applied to a demonstrator protesting Pres-
ident Reagan's policies outside of the Republican National Con-
vention in Dallas. The government may not punish a speaker
simply because the audience "takes serious offense at particular
expression," Justice Brennan wrote for the Court, nor may it
assume that such an audience "is necessarily likely to disturb the
peace .... "29
In its next term, United States v. Eichman ° called upon the
Court to determine the constitutionality of the recently enacted
that even the strongly pro-speech Supreme Court flagburning decisions have
left open the possibility that speakers can be legitimately punished if they
purposefully incite a mob to react violently against them).
25. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
26. I& at 133 n.1.
27. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
28. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
29. Id. at 408.
30. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
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federal Flag Protection Act of 1989.1 The lower court had
thrown out Mr. Eichman's conviction under the Act, a result
affirmed by Justice Brennan's majority opinion, in which he
allows that "desecration of the flag is deeply offensive to many."
Yet many other kinds of expressive conduct are equally offen-
sive-"virulent ethnic and religious epithets" and "scurrilous car-
icatures" among them."2 Just as these and other viewpoints (or
manners of expressing them) cannot be categorically criminal-
ized on the basis of the audience's sensibilities, neither may Con-
gress so grossly restrict the communicative options open to anti-
government protesters.
The most recent case 3 in which the Court has refused to
countenance a heckler's veto was decided during the 1991-1992
term. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement 4 invalidated an ordi-
nance that mandated permits for demonstrating on public prop-
erty. The fee for such permits (not to exceed $1,000) was to be
determined by the local magistrates partially on the basis of the
predicted audience reaction to the demonstration and the result-
ing need for police services. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion
questioned the constitutionality of any ordinance that would
charge more for expressing viewpoints "unpopular with bottle-
throwers. 's
This section has chronicled the development of the "heck-
ler's veto" doctrine from the 1940s onward. Before building an
argument to the effect that the military's current antigay policy
amounts to a heckler's veto, we will examine "civilian" caselaw
from the gay rights movement in which antigay litigants have
attempted unsuccessfully to impose a heckler's veto on homosex-
ual expression.
31. The statute criminalized the conduct of anyone who "knowingly
mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground,
or tramples upon any flag." Id at 317. AsJustice Brennan pointed out, each of
the specifically proscribed actions, with the possible exception of "burning" the
flag, suggests that the lawmakers had set out to punish a specific viewpoint
(disrespect for the flag or for that which the defendant takes it to represent).
32. Id. at 318-19.
33. A more recent case involving the sending of unpopular messages
(specifically the burning of a cross in violation of a local Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance) was not treated by the Court as a "heckler's veto" controversy.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992),
invalidated the ordinance as underinclusive, suggesting that the St. Paul
lawmakers might have been able to more evenhandedly criminalize the display
of any symbols likely to cause a breach of the peace.
34. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
35. Id. at 2403.
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C. ; The Heckler's Veto and the Gay Rights Movement
Most of the time, a young man's choice of a date for the
senior prom is of no great interest to anyone other than
the student, his companion, and, perhaps, a few of their
classmates. But in Aaron Fricke's case, the school authori-
ties actively disapprove of his choice, the other students are
upset, the community is abuzz, and out-of-state newspapers
consider the matter newsworthy. All this fuss arises
because Aaron Fricke's intended escort is another young
man.
3 6
Aaron Fricke's classmates were "upset" by his decision to
take Paul Gilbert to the senior prom. One of his classmates phys-
ically attacked him in school, necessitating five stitches under his
right eye.3 7
Not surprisingly, Judge Pettine took note of this incident in
his opinion. Nonetheless, he ruled for Fricke after determining
that the school administration had it within its power to protect
Aaron and his date from any of the tiny minority of his school-
mates who would be predisposed towards violent response. "To
rule otherwise," he added, "would completely subvert free speech
in the schools by granting other students a 'heckler's veto,'
allowing them to decide - through prohibited and violent
methods - what speech will be heard. The First Amendment
does not tolerate mob rule by unruly school children."
38
Also manifesting features of the heckler's veto is the long
and complicated litigation commenced by Dignity (a group of
gay Catholics) seeking to demonstrate their feelings about the
church leadership. Dignity conducts vigils on the steps of St. Pat-
rick's Cathedral during New York's Gay Pride Parades.3 9 When
the case reached the federal appellate level the first time in 1985,
the majority held that the Police Department's fears about likely
violence were well justified, necessitating the Department's deci-
sion to close the Cathedral steps to all demonstrators during the
36. Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381, 382 (D.R.I. 1980).
37. I telephoned Aaron a few days after the filing of his federal lawsuit
had hit the national press. Almost as soon as I stated my name and ascertained
that it was indeed Aaron on the other end of the phone, he asked, "Are you a
reporter?" When I explained that I was a graduate student doing research on
court cases such as his, he told me he had just gotten back from the hospital.
Telephone interview with Aaron Fricke (1980).
38. Fricke, 491 F. Supp. at 387.
39. Olivieri v. Ward, 613 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd and remanded,
766 F.2d 690 (2nd Cir. 1985), on remand, 637 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd
as modified, 801 F.2d 602 (2nd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987).
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Gay Pride march. Judge Cardamone pointed to several -exigen-
cies which collectively validated the Police Department's caution:
First, several lawsuits have been commenced against the
City by groups attempting to enjoin the holding of the
parade. Second, Catholic War Veterans and Knights of
Columbus members have expressed strong opposition to
gays gathering near the Cathedral. They and a group des-
ignated as the Committee to Defend the Cathedral are
sending literature and mailings in an effort to recruit anti-
gay demonstrators. Last year, some members of these
groups overran the police barriers and claimed the p6lice
had "double-crossed" them by permitting Dignity to hold a
service. Third, over the past year the Catholic Archdiocese
of New York has taken a strong stand publicly against the
economic interests of gay people by refusing to hire them.
Fourth, Dignity members in the past year have demon-
strated more than once at the Cathedral. Fifth, this year's
parade organizers met with the police in late May 1985 to
inform them that according to their own "highly reliable"
sources a large number of Orthodox Jews from Brooklyn
planned to block the parade route near 49th Street. The
Grand Marshall of last year's parade said that if the police
failed to remove the Jewish demonstrators forcibly, the
marchers would. The police have considered all this infor-
mation and as a result of their own investigation credit
much of it. The police believe that the parade this year will
be more volatile than in the past.4
0
Judge Kearse wrote a stinging dissent to the majority's will-
ingness to permit the abridgment of First Amendment liberties
by the most antigay members of Dignity's audience:
[I]t becomes clear that the only reason the Department
seeks to bar plaintiffs' group from the Cathedral sidewalk
is because of the threats of the anti-gay groups. This
response by the Department, in lieu of reliance on its more
usual policy of providing a one-block buffer zone from
whatever the site of plaintiffs' demonstration may be,
plainly has given the Catholic anti-gay groups a classic
"heckler's veto." Such a veto has consistently been rejected
by the courts as a valid basis for restricting the exercise of
free speech in a traditional public forum.4 '
40. Olivieri, 766 F.2d at 692-93.
41. Id. at 696.
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When the same issue presented itself on the eve of the 1986
Gay Pride March, an appellate panel (including two of the same
three judges as the previous year) decided to permit Dignity
members to demonstrate up to one hundred strong for that year
and every year thereafter.42
If an antigay heckler's veto was not permitted to stifle free
speech even in the presence (as in the Olivieri cases) of strong
evidence that violence will result, it is no surprise that courts have
an easier time defusing the heckler's powers in the absence of
such evidence. This was a lesson learned several years ago by the
Washington D.C. Metro system's governing body when it refused
to place a series of pictorial ads submitted by the local Gay Activ-
ists Alliance on subway cars. Metro argued that the poster ads,
which pictured a wide array of Washingtonians of different races
and ages with the one-sentence caption, "Someone in your life is
gay," would offend commuters. Judge Pratt would not permit
such second hand prejudice to trump the First Amendment,
despite the fact that "many riders will undoubtedly take
umbrage" upon viewing the posters.43
The heckler's veto doctrine has not always prevailed when
gay activists have litigated First Amendment issues.44 One partic-
ularly tragic case emerged from Bangor, Maine, in 1985, where a
high school administrator decided to cancel "Tolerance Day"
(organized by a teacher in response to an incident wherein a
group of teenage thugs pushed a gay teen over a bridge to his
death) .4  Townspeople expressed strong displeasure with the
invitation extended to a local lesbian activist as a participant/
42. Olivieri, 801 F.2d at 607-08. Counterdemonstrators in equal numbers
would also be able to use the steps thirty minutes after the Dignity members
had moved on. The police would be granted authority to impose more
restrictive measures "if in their professional judgment circumstances at or near
the site posed a danger to public safety." Id.
43. Gay Activists Alliance v. Washington Metro, 78-2217, Slip op. at 11
(D.D.C. 1979). During my tenure as Executive Director of the ACLU's Western
Missouri affiliate office in the early 1980s, only a threatening letter from a
volunteer attorney was needed to compel the local transit system to permit a gay
rights group to advertise on buses. Their message, perhaps a reflection of the
difference between East Coast and Midwest sensibilities, was that "Someone in
your life may be gay."
44. For a more extensive review of First Amendment gay rights litigation,
see Paul Siegel, Lesbian and Gay Rights as a Free Speech Issue, in GAY PEOPLE, SEX,
AND THE MEDIA (Wolf & Kielwasser, eds. 1991). For a less optimistic view of the
current status of the gay rights agenda as a free speech movement, see Brent H.
Allen, The First Amendment and Homosexual Expression: The Need for an Expanded
Interpretation, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1073 (1994).
45. Solmitz v. Maine School Admin. Dist. No. 59, 495 A.2d 812 (Me.
1985). Chief Justice McKusick concluded for a unanimous court that
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lecturer for the special day. The Maine Supreme Court deter-
mined that the townspeople's displeasure could turn violent, and
therefore the school administrator's act was justified. The ruling
legitmized second hand prejudice.
Solmitz is a special context case because it concerns a local
government's affirmative obligation to protect the children in its
charge, children who after all attend under compulsion of law.
Although the United States military is currently a volunteer
force, military commanders, and the courts that ultimately review
their actions, often treat the armed forces as a special context as
well. The next section suggests why,' nonetheless, the military's
gay exclusionary policy should be seen as a classic heckler's veto,
a manifestation of second hand prejudice.
III. "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL" AS SECOND HAND PREJUDICE
A. A Difference Without a Difference?
Within the field of constitutional law, it is well-accepted that
First Amendment free speech claims and Fifth Amendment or
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims are often inex-
tricably intertwined.46 The interrelatedness of the two kinds of
claims emerges clearly in the gay military debate:
The only reasons the government offers for the military's
regulation of homosexual conduct are based on what that
conduct communicates to other service members who may
be offended by knowledge that some of their fellow
soldiers are gay or lesbian. Moreover, the military policy
treats the very same conduct-hand-holding, kissing, mar-
riage, and sexual conduct-differently depending on
whether it sends a heterosexual or homosexual message.4 7
"Tolerance Day was canceled for safety, order, and security reasons," not
because of the school officials' own prejudices. I& at 819.
46. See Craig Cassin Burke, Fencing Out Politically Unpopular Groups from the
Normal Political Processes: The Equal Protection Concerns of Colorado Amendment Two,
69 IND. L.J. 275 (1993); David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting
Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992);
Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI.
L. REv. 20 (1975); Lawrence B. Solum, Law and Social Theoy: Freedom of
Communicative Action; A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw.
U.L. RE V. 54 (1989); Nadine Strossen, A Framewor* for Evaluating Equal Access
Claims by Student Religious Groups: Is there a Window for Free Speech in the Wall
Separating Church and State?, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 143 (1985).
47. David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy:
First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L REv. 319, 322 (1994).
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Just as the child in Palmore would face hostility by dint of
what her custodial parents' interracial marriage might "commu-
nicate" to onlookers, so too the military argues that identical
behaviors communicate quite different messages depending
upon the gender (rather than the color) of the senders. As crit-
ics from both sides of the issue have pointed out,48 there is very
little difference between the pre-Clinton Administration policy
and current military policies concerning gay soldiers. Whereas
the bold assertion from the old policy that "homosexuality is
incompatible with military service" is gone,49 "homosexual con-
dud' is still grounds for separation from the service. Moreover,
"homosexual conduct" is defined so broadly not only to include
same-sex physical contact whose purpose is sexual release, but
also many kinds of physical contact (including hand-holding)
that might "demonstrate a propensity" to engage in such acts.5 °
The important difference between the old and new policies is
encapsulated in the catchphrase, "don't ask, don't tell." The mil-
itary and the gay recruit enter into a winking dance of deception.
Questions about one's sexual orientation are generally not per-
mitted in the recruitment process (though the military's policies
regarding homosexual conduct will be explained to recruits),
and the recruit is not to volunteer such information then or at a
later date.
At first blush it might seem that the military leadership's
part of the bargain amounts to burying its collective head in the
sand ("if they don't come out as gay, we can pretend we don't
have gays among us"). Something quite different is afoot, how-
ever. Military spokespersons and even the most antigay members
48. Speaking of the soon to be publicly released "don't ask, don't tell"
policy, Congressman Barney Frank indicated that "it does not meet the kind of
minimum standards that I was hoping for or that several of us reiterated a
couple of weeks ago." He thus "urged the President not to accept it in the form
that I see it." Gays in the Military (News Conf. with Barney Frank (D-MA), Fed.
News Serv., July 16, 1993). Reacting to the feature of the new policy warning
soldiers that telling anyone of their gay orientation will create a strong
presumption that they will engage in prohibited homosexual conduct, Senator
Thurmond told the Senate Committee: "I believe homosexuality is
incompatible with military service. I was glad to see a similar statement in
Secretary Aspin's policy memorandum." Gays in the Military, Hearing of the Senate
Armed Serv. Comm. (Fed. News Serv., July 21, 1993).
49. Regulations on Homosexual Conduct in the Military (News Conf. with
Jamie Gorelick, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense, Fed. News Serv., Dec. 22, 1993
(hereinafter Regulation Dec. 22, 1993]; Gays in the Military, Hearing of the Military
Forces and Personel Subcomm. of the House Armed Serv. Comm. (Statement by Sec. of
Defense Les Aspin and Joint Chief of Staff Chariman Colin Powell, Fed. News
Serv., July 21, 1993) [hereinafter, House Hearings].
50. Cole & Eskridge, supra note 47, at 320.
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of Congress are on record openly admitting that gays and lesbi-
ans have served in the military with distinction for as long as any-
one can remember, and that they likely will continue to do so.5
The only gays who need to be separated from the service are
those whose orientations become known, those who "come out"
as gay.
The military leadership offers two main reasons for refusing
to enlist open gays. Both reasons rely upon a prediction of nega-
tive reaction from the majority of heterosexual troops. The first
argument is the privacy rationale, usually presented in a context
that includes reference to the cramped quarters and shared
shower and toilet facilities forced upon some, soldiers. We sepa-
rate men and women, so the reasoning goes, so won't we also
have to separate gays and straights?
The second reason is the more global claim that the pres-
ence of open gays will jeopardize "unit cohesion." The presence
of open gays, opponents assert, would lower the morale of the
vast majority of the troops.5 2 Proponents of this line of argument
recognize the need to distinguish antigay prejudice from racial
prejudice because the military has done a remarkable job of cre-
ating a highly racially integrated environment. The military
accomplished this feat even though the majority of white soldiers
favored continued segregation when President Truman's direc-
tive was issued back in 1948.
The argument for continuing the military's gay ban,
whether phrased as an issue of sexual modesty or as; one of
morale, is a textbook example of the kind of second hand preju-
dice that the Supreme Court so critically examined in the Palmore
51. Even before the first of his hearings on the gay military issue, Senator
Nunn indicated he has "no doubt that homosexuals have served, and are
serving today, in our armed forces with distinction, and many times with
courage and valor." Gays in the Militay, (CNN Television Broadcast, Jan. 27,
1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File. Senator Warner of West'
Virginia testified: "History has shown that they have served side by side in many
capacities. And in my experience in the Department of the Navy, I think most
of those services which were quite commendable I said the other day, it took a
special type of patriotism going in, knowing you're violating the law, subjecting
yourself to humiliation from fellow service persons, and indeed being tossed
out." The Role of Unit Cohesion in Developing Combat Effectiveness in Relation to the
Ban on Homosexuals in the Militaiy, Senate Armhed Servs. Comm., Reuter
Transcript Rep., Mar. 31, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File
[hereinafter Role of Unit Cohesion]. This viewpoint has been echoed by Colin
Powell and others among the upper echelons of the military. Cole & Eskridge,
supra note 47, at 332.
52. Role of Unit Cohesion, supra note 51 (testimony of Dale Henderson,
Former Commander, Army Research Institute; David Marlowe, Military
Psychiatrist, Walter Reed Hospital).
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line of cases. Moreover, because the predicted catastrophic
results would come about only as a result of gays' "coming out"
openly, the military ban raises First Amendment issues. As Cole
and Eskridge point out, "the very name given to the military's
policy-'don't ask, don't tell'-reveals that it is designed to regu-
late expression.""3 The next two sections will offer refutations to
the military's privacy and unit morale arguments.
B. Stop Looking At Me That Way! Sexual Modesty and the Military
The gay military issue has tended to proceed by analogy. To
determine whether or not the military would be able to adjust to
having openly gay soldiers in their midst without suffering dimin-
ished morale, analogies have been made to the racial desegrega-
tion of the armed forces after World War II and to the
experience of other nations that have permitted openly gay
soldiers to serve. Arguments for keeping the gay ban in defer-
ence to the privacy needs of the majority of (presumably hetero-
sexual) soldiers have been based on an analogy to the armed
forces' relatively recent experience of more fully integrating
women into military roles.
Advocates seeking to justify a continuation of the gay ban
find it necessary to argue that many privacy issues accruing to the
military are unique to that setting. Thus, for example, Congress-
man John Doolittle (R-CA) testified in front of the Republican
Research Committee's Task Force about his recently having vis-
ited the Naval Academy at Annapolis for the first time:
It's truly impressive to see the caliber of young people that
serve there in the Academy. It also was driven home to me
the conditions in which they live. They're close quarters
.... It's two to a room. I understand at West Point it's
three to a room.54
Professor David Schlueter of the St. Mary's School of Law
echoed this sentiment in his testimony before the Nunn
committee:
It is critical that it be understood - the potential impor-
tance of this issue. Unlike most civilian jobs, ser-
vicemembers typically do not leave the installation at the
end of the work day to return to civilian life. The ser-
vicemembers' home is often a small two-person tent, a
cramped berth in a submarine, or an open-bay barracks
where a large number of individuals share not only a com-
53. Cole & Eskridge, supra note 47, at 332.
54. Republican Research Comm., supra note 7.
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mon sleeping area but a common shower and restroom
facilities as well. What little physical privacy exists in such
conditions is highly treasured. 55
It is precisely because of the close quarters in which some
categories of military personnel must serve that our policy has
been to separate living and bathing facilities for men and
women. Several participants in the gay military debate argued
that the same reasoning would mandate separating gays from
straights. Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL) chided his
colleagues:
Anyone who has a daughter has to imagine your daughter
living in a barracks with a bunch of men and dressing and
showering. You'd say that's unconscionable, that's wrong.
I am unable to distinguish the difference between having
to do that with people whose sexual orientation and
arousal level is exactly the same and maybe more, for all I
know.
56
Congressman Hyde's reference to sexual "arousal levels" car-
ries with it the presumption that the main reason we segregate
males and females in military settings is to avoid sexual mingling.
This is a sentiment that several senators emphasized time and
again in questioning witnesses before the Nunn committee.
Consider this exchange between Senator William Cohen and
Lawrence Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense:
SEN. COHEN: Let me just ask you: Should there be sepa-
rate facilities for women on board submarines or aircraft
carriers?
MR. KORB: I think there already are separate facilities.
SEN. COHEN: But, should there be?
MR. KORB: I think there should be.
SEN. COHEN: Why?
MR. KORB: Well, because of the way in which society
expects us to separate people.
SEN. COHEN: No, no. But, why? What would be the
rational basis for society demanding a separation of the
sexes?
55. Lifting the Ban on Gays in the Military: Senate Armed Services Committee
Hearings, Fed. News Serv., Mar. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Script
File [hereinafter Lifting the Ban] (statement of David A. Schlueter, Professor at
St. Mary's University).
56. Republican Research Comm., supra note 7. Speaking to the same body,
Representative Floyd Spence (R-SC) added: "With the women in the military
we have to have separate facilities for bathing and toilets and so forth, sleeping
quarters. What would we have to contend with in separating facilities with
homosexuals in the military?" Id.
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MR. KORB: I think it's based upon the moral values that
we have.
SEN. COHEN: Does it have to do with sexual attraction of
male and female?'
MR. KORB: Certainly. That's one component of it.
5 7
At another point in the hearings, Senator Dan Coats is question-
ing William Dale Henderson, former commander of the Army
Research Institute:
MR. HENDERSON: So, sex does have a negative effect on
military activities.
SEN. COATS: Is that then the basis essentially for segregat-
ing men and women in close living situations?
MR. HENDERSON: Well, you have other issues too. You'
have the privacy issues -
SEN. COATS: But it's the sexual attraction, tension, that
could either undermine or destroy the unit. That is the
basis for separate living quarters?
58
Senator Coats clearly wished to elicit a response to the effect
that the main reason for segregating men and women in the
armed forces is the desire to dampen heterosexual attractions.
Sexual modesty, however, is not simply the opposite of sexual las-
civiousness. The genders shield their bodies from each other for
reasons far more complex than to avoid signalling a desire for
sexual comingling.
Sexual modesty, especially women from men, is often a very
physical manifestation of a much larger phenomenon. Our soci-
ety's long history of complementary sex roles assigns males and
females to separate spheres.5 9 Our genders define which doors
we are permitted to enter and which are closed to us, which con-
versations we will be privy to, and which will be denied us:
The separation of men and women allows them to play
complementary roles. They are mysteries to each other.
"What does a woman want?" asked Sigmund Freud, one of
the most insightful men of his time. It was a question that
could still be understood well by teenage boys in the 1950s
and 1960s. In the traditional sex-divided world, men and
women cannot fully understand each other's experiences.
57. Role of Unit Cohesion, supra note 51.
58. Id.
59. See generally SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1961).
Traditionally, the female "sphere" was one presumed to be relatively lacking in
sexual desire. Janet E. Larson, Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good
Nature "Deceit" A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 388
(1993).
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Their meetings are explorations and adventures into the
unknown .6
The ramifications of this deceptively complex truth - that men
and women function in quite different worlds - can be as play-
ful as the frequent jokes in the Cathy comic strip about how men
and women manifest fundamentally different life coping styles,
or as serious as the Supreme Court's ruling that sexual harass-
ment claims must sometimes be judged using the perspective of a
"reasonable woman."6 1 In any event, so widespread are the effects
of gender segregation in our society that some linguists treat
communication between the sexes as a form of intercultural
communication.6 2 Males and females shield their naked bodies
from each other, then, sometimes simply to maintain their status
as the "other."63
Meyrowitz refers in the quote above to teenage boys from
the 1950s and the 1960s. A central tenet of his book is that the
kinds of candid entertainment programming that were produced
on television in the 1970s and beyond have served to merge the
separate spheres. Television in the 1970s permitted men and
women to see each other's secrets or "backstages." Yet even in
the 1990s there is much resistance to having some aspects of the
opposite sex's private sphere exposed to public view. This is per-
haps most apparent in the controversy over breast feeding in
public. While some of the resistance to public breast feeding
stems from men's "inability to make a distinction between what is
female and what is sexual .... the truth is that there's nothing
sexy about nursing in public, a process that usually includes a
60. JOSHUA MEYRowrrz, No SENSE OF PLACE: THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC
MEDIA ON SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 204-05 (1985).
61. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
62. See generally DEBORAH TANNEN, You JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN
AND MEN IN CONVERSATION (1990) (arguing that male and female
communication systems are so different that they can be thought of as
"genderlects" of a common language).
63. The shielding of one's eyes from the opposite sex's naked form
occurs in a host of contexts that are largely devoid of sexual tension. As a
graduate student in the late 1970s, I shared a double room with three others -
a classmate and- two faculty members (all female) - at an academic
conference. It became a running joke during our week or so together that the
most frequently heard utterance was "Paul, turn around" (because at any given
time, the chances are one of my roommates was changing clothes). The
incident springs to mind because it shows that sexual modesty is not practiced
solely to stem sexual desire. The only male in the room, openly gay, was being
told to avert his eyes from the female form.
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deft disarrangement of garments and... is quite like hiding a
soccer ball beneath your shirt.""
The societal norm against exposure of the naked body to the
opposite sex is applied asymmetrically. We are far more con-
cerned with protecting women from having to reveal their naked
bodies to men than vice versa. We do this out of a recognition of
the difference in power between men and women.' Thus, while
many police departments have established policies dictating that
strip searches of suspects will be conducted only by officers of the
same gender, the rules are seen as a means of protecting female
suspects.' When hospitals debate whether or not to employ
mixed-sex wards as a cost-cutting move, it is the privacy of their
female patients that weighs more heavily on the side of sex segre-
gation.67 Similarly, the California Fair Employment and Housing
Commission recently held that a hospital which forbade male
nurses to care for pregnant women during labor and delivery was
not in violation of that state's employment discrimination stat-
utes.' Even at such venues as swimsuit-optional beaches, women
are often quite reluctant to expose their naked bodies.'a
64. Anna Quindlen, To Feed or Not To Feed, N.Y. Timss, May 25, 1994, at
A21.
65. This is a reality that manifests itself not only in life, but in art as well.
Professor Kathleen Lant contrasts the depiction of nudity as a metaphor in
male versus female poets: "The unclothed male body is - in terms of the
dominant figurative systems of Western discourse - powerful in that it is
sexually potent, sexually armed; the naked female body is... vulnerable in that
it is sexually accessible, susceptible to penetration, exploitation, rape,
pregnancy." Kathleen Lant, The Big Stip Tease: Female Bodies and Male Power in
the Poetry of Sylvia Plath, 34 CoNTEMP. LrrsRATru' 620, 626 (1993).
66. Philip Mascoll, Strip Search in Public Is Against Police Rules, ToRoNTo
STAR, Sept. 14, 1993, at A6. For a similar argument with respect to sexual
modesty in the workplace, see Susan Swartz, A Modest Proposal for the Military,
THE PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 13, 1992, at 8D.
67. Jenny Hope, Are Sing-Sex Hospital Wards Becoming a Thing of the Past?,
DAILY MAIL, Aug. 16, 1994, at 36; Andrew Cole, Health: A Mixture of Fear and
Embarrassment in Hospital, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 2, 1993, at 22. Congressman
Joseph P. Kennedy's admonition to his colleagues at a recent hearing is also
instructive:
The VA will testify that it has "always opened its door to the nation's
women veterans." But, the sad fact is that is literally the case. One
female veteran said, "I was the only female ... I had to undress in a
room with a door that would not close while men were lined up and
down the hallway." This sort of 'open door policy" has got to stop.
Improving Health Care for Women Veterans, House Veterans' Affairs/Oversight and
Investigations, Mar. 9, 1994 (citations omitted).
68. Ban on Male Nurses Tending Pregnant Women Upheld, L.A. Timms, Sept.
13, 1994, at A24.
69. Liz Hodgkinson has observed:
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Men and women experience nakedness differently. It is no
surprise, then, that Congiessman Hyde asked us to imagine the
horror of his daughter being forced to share close quarters in the
military with members of the opposite sex.70 Indeed, it would
have seemed quite odd for him to have expressed a parallel con-
cern about his son. We seek to protect our daughters, and
women in general, because of their perceived powerlessness. We
should feel no corresponding need to protect heterosexual ser-
vicemen and women from their lesbian and gay counterparts
because the latter groups wield the lesser power.
The analogy between gender segregation and the posited
need for segregation based on sexual orientation thus is at best
an imperfect one. There is no history of segregating lesbians
from heterosexual females, or gay males from heterosexual ones,
that corresponds to the long history of segregating the sexes
themselves. As Congressman Barney Frank explained in a debate
with Senator Dan Coats on a Face the Nation broadcast:
I have to point out to people that gay men and straight
men have been sharing dormitories, showers, health clubs
for a very long time. I mean, gay men and lesbians
throughout this country join health clubs, they live in col-
lege dormitories. We don't have ourselves dry-cleaned.
We've been taking showers for a long time.7 1
Thus far we have treated the shared showers analogy as if it
were on all fours, intended as an argument for the need to pro-
vide separate bathrooms and living spaces for openly gay soldiers.
But the analogy was always intended instead as an argument in
support of maintaining the ban against openly gay soldiers alto-
gether. Segregated barracks of heterosexual males and Of heter-
osexual females would presumably be devoid of sexual tensions.
Usually, a woman will have a male companion, and whereas the man
will strip off with scant ceremony as soon as the couple find a suitable
spot, the woman will put up the umbrella or other concealing
construction, then get out the book or picnic, and spread out the
towels before, very slowly, taking her things off. Having taken up her
position she will rarely move .... The only time a woman will move
on a nude beach is when going into the sea - and then she will only
go if her man comes with her .... While most men on a nude beach
are exhibitionist, women are timid. They have braved it, and they like
the sun on their naked bodies - but there remains an element of
modesty notably absent with the men.
Liz Hodgkinson, Stripping Off Is Only the First Step, SUN. TELEGRAPH, Aug. 28,
1994, at 12.
70. See supra text accompanying note 56.
71. Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 31, 1993), Reuter
Transcript Report, available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File.
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By the same reasoning, lesbian and especially gay male barracks
would be hotbeds of orgiastic expression.
It remains for us to address the second argument used in
favor of continuing the military gay ban. The claim that integrat-
ing "known homosexuals" into the military will damage troop
morale in ways that racial integration of the forces did not is the
subject of the next section.
C. Benign Is as Benign Does: Can't We Just All Get Along?
Many gay activists hoped that then-Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, by dint of his own minority status,
would manifest a special sensitivity to members of sexual minor-
ity groups.7 2 Such hopes proved naive when Powell testified in
front of Congressman Hamilton's committee. Homosexuality is
not a "benign" characteristic such as race or color, he told the
Committee.7 3 Rather, homosexuality is a matter of conduct. It is
one of the most "fundamental" aspects of human behavior
imaginable.74
General Powell seems to be saying that racial prejudices are
intolerable, while prejudices against gays are at least understand-
able if not excusable. The difference between the two kinds of
prejudice hinges on the "benign" nature of race. It is possible
that Powell intended by this choice of words to focus on the
immutability of race or the lack of choice involved. However,
such a posited contrast between race and sexual orientation does
not fit currently available evidence. It is fairly uniformly
accepted within the biologic and social sciences communities
that sexual orientation is neither a matter of choice nor generally
changeable.75
72. Congressman Barney Frank [D-MA], Address at the National Lesbian
and Gay Journalists Association Annual Convention (Sept. 1994) (attended by
author).
73. House Hearings, supra note 49 (opening statement of General Colin
Powell).
74. John Lancaster, Why the Military Supports the Ban on Gays, WASH. Posr,
Jan. 28, 1993, at A8 (quoting from Powell speech at U. S. Naval Academy).
75. See generally Laura Allen & Roger Gorski, Sexual Orientation and the Size
of the Anterior Commissure in the Human Brain, 89 PRoc. NAT'L. AcAD. Sci. USA
7199 (1992); J. Michael Bailey & Richard C. Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male
Sexual Orientation, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHOL. 1089 (1991); Eli Coleman,
Changing Approaches to the Treatment of Homosexuality, in HoMOSEXUALrr.
SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICA.L IssuEs 81 (William Paul et al. eds.,
1982); Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome
and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 Sci. 321 (1993); Simon LeVay, A Difference in
Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 Sci. 1034
(1991); Thomas H. Maugh, Study Strongly Links Genetics, Homosexuality, L.A.
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More likely, Powell intended to emphasize that racial differ-
ences are matters of status, while sexual orientation translates
into behavior."6 This behavior offends many heterosexuals. If this
is Powell's argument, his is a sadly ironic oversimplification of
racism and of prejudice generally. Prejudices may be triggered
by "benign," non-behavioral characteristics such as skin color,
but the prejudice itself is an attribution of behaviors and atti-
tudes to members of the group manifesting the benign charac-
teristic."7 For example, Jews are stereotyped as greedy, women as
overly emotional, Asians as brainy but rigid, etc.
In a brief scene in the motion picture, Mississippi Burning,
the sheriff's deputy observes his wife playing with their black
neighbor's toddler. "Their kids are so cute," he later confides to
his spouse. This is the same character who is later sentenced to
ten years imprisonment for his part in the killing of the three
civil rights workers. Yet even his brand of racism is not directed
at the "benign" characteristic of skin color itself. Racism does
not stem from color, it stems from behavioral attributions associ-
ated with color. When racists say negative things about African-
Americans, such statements generally do not focus on skin color
or Negroid physical characteristics. Racism is every bit as much a
negative reaction to "conduct" as is discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.
In our own society, the two most fundamental threads of
anti-black racism are attributions of dangerousness and of unpro-
ductiveness (the latter being sometimes manifested in the belief
that blacks are not as intelligent as whites, sometimes in the
belief that they are lazy).
TIMES, July 16, 1993, at Al. See generally Affidavit I of Richard Green, in GAYS
AND THE MnurrARY 56 (Marc Wolinsky & Kenneth Sherrill eds., 1993).
76. Powell never explained what he meant when he referred to
homosexuality as an issue of "conduct." It is unlikely that he intended
reference to overtly harassing behaviors by gays towards straights, such as
unwelcome touching or offensive ogling in the showers, because the military
would not need a complete ban on openly gay soldiers to prevent such conduct.
For the purposes of this Article, it is assumed that Powell was making implicit
reference to the scope of "homosexual conduct" in the main part of the policy
itself, i.e., same-sex physical contact engaged in for sexual release. For Powell,
then, antigay prejudice is different from racial prejudice in that the former is
triggered by the knowledge that the object of the prejudice is known or
presumed (perhaps by dint of his having "come out" as openly gay) to engage
in this kind of sexual conduct (even if exclusively off-base), while the latter is
triggered by the mere fact of the object's skin color. This section of the Article
is intended as a refutation of Powell's posited distinction.
77. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
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"There is nothing more painful to me at this stage in my life
than to walk down the street and hear footsteps and start think-
ing about robbery .... Then look around and see somebody
white and feel relieved.""' These words, spoken by none other
than the Reverend Jesse Jackson at a meeting of the PUSH
organization on Chicago's south side in 1993, encapsulate the
first of the two threads of anti-black racism in our society, the
attribution of violent criminal intent to African-Americans, espe-
cially to young male African-Americans. It is the same attribution
that created a cause celebr67 9 at the offices of the Washington
Post several years earlier when Richard Cohen's magazine col-
umn expressed sympathy with white jewelry shop owners who
used an electric buzzer entry system to exclude young black
males from their shops.8 0 These shopkeepers were not acting
out of unadorned racism, Cohen claimed. Rather they were
reacting to a fear of the combination of race, age and gender.
Such a reaction is not entirely unfounded, in that "[y] oung black
males commit an inordinate amount of urban crime."81 Cohen,
usually viewed as one of the Post's more liberal writers, certainly
had misgivings about his own logic:
Of course, all policies based on generalities have their
injustices. A storekeeper might not know that the youths
he has refused to admit are theology students - rich ones
at that. But then insurance companies had no way of
knowing I was not a typical teen-age driver. I paid through
the nose anyway.82
The Post columnist revisited the issue recently in the context
of a column criticizing, of all things, the Clinton Administration's
"trial balloon" suggesting the possibility of the military's admit-
ting gays into the military but putting them in separate dormito-
78. Mary A. Johnson, Cime: New Frontier, Jesse Jackson Calls It Top Civil
Rights Issue, CHI. SUN. TiMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at 4.
79. For a synopsis of the controversy itself, see Greg Henderson, More
Than 1,000 Protest Washington Post Magazine, Sept. 14, 1986, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File; Alexander Cockburn, The Liberal Mind in 1986: Richard
Cohen, 243 NATION 334 (1986); Clarence Page, Black Youths: Buzz in or Buzz Off?,
CHI. TmB., Nov. 2, 1986, at C3; Juan Williams, Closed Doors: Benign Racism in
America, NEw REP., Nov. 10, 1986, at 18; Walter E. Williams et. al., The Jeweler's
Dilemma: How Would You Respond? Store Owners Who Refuse to Admit Young Black
Males, NEW REP., Nov. 10, 1986, at 22.
80. Richard Cohen, Closing the Door on Crime, WASH. PosT MAG., Sept. 7,
1986, at W13.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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ries. s3 The military brass assumed that all gays are "rabbits in
disguise" ready to copulate at every opportunity (just as many
whites assume that all blacks are "criminals in disguise?"). Cohen
reflected on some of the lessons he had learned since 1986:
No column of mine has ever generated as much contro-
versy. Little wonder. I condoned a pernicious generaliza-
tion, and while I heard from many people who simply
called me a bigot, the ones I remember best were young
black males who told tales of being locked out of stores,
being watched constantly while shopping or - a story that
stays with me still - the young lawyer who emptied the
laundry room in his apartment house simply by showing
up. Women fled. 4
The assumption of black dangerousness forces upon Afri-
can-Americans a coping style that makes it "folly to compete for a
taxi on a street corner with whites. It means realizing that pru-
dence dictates dressing up whenever you are likely to encounter
strangers (including clerks, cops, and doormen) who can make
your life miserable by mistaking you for a tramp, a slut, or a
crook."85 The crucial point again is that these "strangers" are
reacting not to "benign" racial features but rather to behavioral
attributions based upon those features.
There is a second thread of racist attributions borne by Afri-
can-Americans in this society. Whereas young black males are
feared as potentially violent, almost all blacks are presumed less
competent than whites. In responding to a Times-Picayune poll in
New Orleans, for example, whites reported their belief that
blacks are not only more violent, but also less intelligent and
more lazy than themselves. The majority of white respondents
attributed blacks' relatively low socioeconomic standing to a
"[lack of] motivation or willpower." 6 More recent data from the
National Opinion Research Center supports these results. In
addition, it emphasizes that the various racial minorities in
America all have rather negative images of the others.87
Even those African-Americans who have seemingly "made it"
in the corporate world are not spared the presumption of rela-
tive incompetence. Author and journalist Ellis Cose tells of a visit
83. Richard Cohen, Locked Out By Bigotry, WASH. PosT, Feb. 2, 1993, at
A21.
84. Id.
85. ELLis COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 55-56 (1993).
86. Elizabeth Mullener, Race Relations In and Around New Orleans, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Nov. 18, 1993, at A16.
87. All Things Considered: Portrait of America-Minority v. Minority (Nat'l Pub.
Radio broadcast, Mar. 5, 1994).
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to his office by an African-American colleague, an assistant man-
aging editor for the New York Times:
I took him to lunch, and after a few drinks we fell into a
discussion of people at the Times, among them a talented
black editor whose career seemed to have stalled. Was he
in line, I asked, for a high-level editorship that would soon
be vacant? My companion agreed that the editor would
probably do very well in the job, but then he pointed out
that a black person had never held such a post at the New
York Times. The Times would have to think hard,, he indi-
cated, before changing that, for they could not afford to
have a black journalist fail in such a visible position ....
Failure at the highest levels of the Times was a privilege
apparently reserved for whites.88
Such racist assumptions are quite different from white peo-
ple's attribution to blacks of criminal intent:
It is unlikely that discrimination against certifiably "safe"
blacks stems primarily from fear of black violence. Black
executives, for instance, are not barred from private coun-
try clubs because white members fear their African-Ameri-
can peers will rob them. Nor do black associates in law
firms have such difficulty in advancing because white part-
ners fear that black lawyers will rape their wives.8 9
An analysis of racial discrimination, then, reveals precisely
what General Powell contends does not exist. The dynamics of
discrimination, almost by definition, require behavioral attribu-
tions. They do not flow solely or directly from such "benign" per-
sonal characteristics as skin color. The specific behavioral
attributions may be ludicrous, as when we presume that to be
born with a dark skin color is to be born stupid or to be geneti-
cally predisposed towards violence, or both. Or the attributions
might have more than a kernel of truth to them.90 The crucial
88. CosE, supra note 85, at 61-62.
89. Id. at 12-13.
90. Consider, for example, a cross-cultural truism from the field of
"chronemics," the study of how we treat time. Unlike Americans from
Northern European backgrounds, African Americans (as well as persons from
most Middle Eastern and Latin American cultures) manifest a tendency to treat
time in a "polychronic" fashion. Time is "experienced," it is not "used,"
"spent," "lost," or "made up." The Northern European's mania about
punctuality is not a part of polychronic cultures. It thus makes sense to speak of
"colored people's time." From the Northern European perspective, persons
who do not show up on time, or who take their time socializing and do not
seem to show "respect" for others' felt "need" to not waste time (persons who,
for example, socialize while double-parked, as if to say that the few seconds of
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point is that General Powell's posited distinction between attribu-
tions based upon skin color and attributions based upon
declared sexual orientation - such as the common-sense
assumption that most openly gay soldiers are not celibate9" - is
unpersuasive.
If the state has no legitimate interest in fostering racial ani-
mus (as the Court made clear in Palmore), so too the fact of off-
base, private, consensual, sexual conduct among gays is not prop-
erly the government's concern. This should be seen as an
unremarkable proposition, given that the government has
openly admitted in the course of the gay military debate that its
only reason for wanting to regulate such sexual conduct is that
some heterosexual soldiers might feel queasy knowing of its exist-
ence. This is precisely the kind of second hand prejudice that
the government has no business legitimizing.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article's thesis has been that the military's recently
revamped policies concerning homosexuality, which provide for
exclusion of openly gay soldiers whose "homosexual conduct"
becomes known, amount to granting a government imprimatur
to second hand prejudice. Such governmental acquiescence to
others' personal animus against recognizable minority groups
has been rejected by the Supreme Court in numerous circum-
stances, especially when such animus takes the form of a "heck-
ler's veto" aimed at squelching acts of speech (such as coming
out as openly gay).None of this is to suggest that liberalizing the armed forces'
gay exclusion policies will be an easy task. By most accounts, the
vast majority of American soldiers oppose lifting the homosexual
ban.92 Survey data on the acceptance of "the homosexual lifes-
inconvenience this may cause others is not of great consequence) will be viewed
as lazy and unproductive. EDWARD T. HALL, THE DANCE OF LIFE: THE OTHER
DIMENSION OF TIME 41-54 (1983).
Then too, whites might form prejudices against blacks on the basis of the
latter's use of "non-standard" forms of English grammar and/or pronunciation.
Consider the mini-firestorm caused by then New York City Mayor Ed Koch's
public lambasting of African American educators who employ such non-
standard pronunciations as "axe" for "ask." The Years With White, 241 THE
NATION 329 (1985).
91. See supra note 76.
92. See Role of Unit Cohesion, supra note 51 (testimony of Dale Henderson,
David Marlowe, and Lawrence Korb).
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tyle" as at least being not necessarily immoral are no more
encouraging.93
While General Powell's attempt to contrast the nature of
antigay and antiblack prejudice was unconvincing, a silver lining
emerges from looking back to the military's long struggle with
racial integration begun in the 1940s. A mere three years after
President Truman's 1948 order, the ratio of white soldiers oppos-
ing racial integration had dropped from 80 percent to 44 per-
cent.9 4 The military's model for sensitivity training on racial and
other diversity issues has been lauded and unabashedly copied in
the civilian world.95
Although it is possible that negative attitudes towards gays
are more widely and deeply felt than are racist attitudes, there
are striking similarities between the obstacles faced by the mili-
tary in enforcing President Truman's directive and that which
will be faced by the military should the Supreme Court find the
current homosexual ban unconstitutional. 96 As NAACP Presi-
dent William Gibson told the Nunn committee (through Senator
Kennedy), the very same arguments seen now for keeping the
homosexual ban had been used two generations ago: "They said
whites would not shower with blacks, they would not sleep in the
same barracks, they would not take orders from black
superiors.
" 97
There is no reason to conclude that the military is incapable
of devising sensitivity training that, together with leadership by
93. Id. (Testimony of William Dale Henderson).
94. Id. (Testimony of Lawrence Korb).
95. Frontline: The Color of Your Skin, (PBS television broadcast, June 11,
1991).
96. While a detailed review of gay military caselaw is not the purpose of
this Article, suffice it to say that there have been some notable exceptions to the
general pattern of judicial deference to the military. See Meinhold v. United
States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (asserting one's sexual
orientation not sufficient to justify separation); Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F.
Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (striking down "old" exclusion policy as violative
of Equal Protection and Due Process); Able I v. United States, 847 F. Supp.
1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting preliminary injunction against enforcement of
new "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy); Able II v. United States, No. CV 94-0974,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13519 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1994) (rejecting government's
motion to dismiss complaint). Moreover, some of these exceptional cases
manifest a strong "heckler's veto" texture. In Cammermeyer, Judge Zilly required
the military to reinstate plaintiff, based upon Equal Protection and Due Process
grounds. The heckler's veto is found in his assertion that "the rationales
offered by the Government to justify its exclusion of homosexual
servicemembers are grounded solely in prejudice." Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp.
at 926.
97. Role of Unit Cohesion, supra note 51.
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example, would serve to smooth the transition to a more liberal
policy. Much research in the civilian sector indicates that such
training can be highly effective.9" This data is very consistent
with the often reported finding that persons who are knowingly
acquainted with at least one gay person are much less likely to
report antigay animus than are those who do not believe they
have any gay friends or acquaintances.99 The upside of being
part of an invisible minority may thus be that to know us is to love
US.
Prior to the 1992 Presidential campaign, few in the gay
rights movement would have guessed that the likely next battle to
be felt nationwide, and most likely to produce a Supreme Court
ruling, would be the military issue.1 °° None in the movement
would have wished it, with the courts' longstanding tendency to
defer to the military. Still, that is where we are. The next year or
two should show whether or not the Supreme Court will recog-
nize the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy as an unadorned
heckler's veto, a form of prejudice once removed.
98. See generally Mark A. Chesler & Ximena Z~fiiga, Dealing with Prejudice
and Conflict in the Classroom: The Pink Triangle Exercise, 19 TEACHING Soc. 173
(1991); James M. Croteau & Susanne Morgan, Combating Homophobia in AIDS
Education, 68J. COUNSELING & DEV. 86 (1989);Joel W. Wells, Teaching About Gay
and Lesbian Sexual and Affectional Orientation Using Explicit Films to Reduce
Homophobia, 28 J. HumANIsTIc ED. & DEV. 18 (1989).
99. Affidavit of Gregory Herek, in GAYS AND THE MILrrARY, supra note 75,
at 121, 123.
100. Keen, At Crucial Time, Is the Movement Fit for the Right: Some Important
Cases Will Soon Be on the Mat at the Supreme Court, WASH. BLADE, Aug. 5, 1994, at 1.
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